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Imagine you are 20 years old. You live in a modest apartment in a low-income 
neighborhood in New Jersey, splitting the rent with a roommate while you attend school and work 
as many hours as your employer has available to make ends meet. You arrive home one day to 
learn your roommate managed to pick up a new big-screen TV, and with football season around 
the corner you are happy to help him mount it on the wall.  
The next morning there is a knock on the door and two uniformed officers place you and 
your roommate under arrest for possession of stolen property. Your bail is set at $2,500. Unable 
to afford the cost, you are forced to sit in jail as you await trial. Weeks pass. Classes go unattended. 
Shifts are missed at work. Prosecutors offer a plea deal that includes probation, but you are hesitant 
to adopt a record for a crime that you never committed. Instead, you sit in jail for 4 months before 
your roommate admits to having stolen the TV. You are subsequently released.  
No crime was committed, but a price has been paid. Four months in prison likely cost you 
your job, your good standing in class, and potentially your home—assuming rent went unpaid due 
to a lack of income. You spent that time in jail not for a crime you were guilty of or a risk you 
posed to the community, but because you could not afford the cost of bail. These collateral costs, 
solely related to pre-trial detention, can be devastating for an individual, their future, their family, 
and their community.    
Now imagine the same circumstances except your parents are willing are willing to loan 
you $2,500. You post bail, get released from jail, attend your classes, and make every shift of work 
for the next four months. In the meantime, you are free and able to prepare to fight the charges 
against you before the charges are eventually dropped. These scenarios involve the same 




avoid sitting in jail for months, and the other could not. Worse yet, under the cash-bail system 
described here, a person charged with a much more serious, violent offense may have bail set at 
one million dollars, but so long as they can put together that large sum of money they will not have 
to sit in a concrete cell while they await trial.  
Cash bail, in practice, is not informed by proper considerations and is an unfair, seemingly 
arbitrary means of determining which offenders are detained pre-trial. The system’s 
disproportionate discrimination against the poor and ethnic minorities has resulted in a decades-
long call for reform in the United States. Some states, including New Jersey in 2017, have enacted 
bail reforms in effort to reduce an overcrowded prison population and curb discriminatory 
practices in the justice system.1  
Notably. analysis of the early returns of these implemented reforms will vary based on the 
reader’s preconceived assumptions and goals regarding their implementation. Specifically, this 
paper considers particular goals of reform, including (1) the reduction of New Jersey’s pre-trial 
prison population, (2) curing socio-economic prejudice in pre-trial detention determinations, and 
(3) addressing racial disparities in the pre-trial prison population. The initial data indicates that 
New Jersey’s reforms have been effective in reducing the total population of pre-trial defendants 
and limiting the impact of socio-economic status on detention determinations but has not 






1 Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS., http://njcourts.gov/courts/criminal/reform.html (last 




II. THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND CALLS FOR REFORM IN THE US 
A. The History of Bail Reform in the United States 
In the American colonies, presumptions favoring pre-trial release had been carried over 
from England.2 “Personal sureties” from family or friends served to incentivize and ensure that the 
accused party would abide by the conditions of one’s release and attend their court hearings at a 
later date.3 After the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, most states enacted their 
own constitutions that included provisions for bail laws, including protections against “excessive 
bail.”4  
Later, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 which stipulated that for “all arrests in 
criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death”, and established 
judicial discretion in setting bail.5 Soon after, the Eight Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, adopted in 1791, ordered that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”, establishing 
the right of the accused to have an opportunity for pre-trial release.6 Notably, the Supreme Court 
extended this provision to the States and state-court defendants in 2019.7 
In 1966 Congress passed the Bail Reform Act, which mandated that federal non-capital 
case defendants should be released with the least restrictive conditions necessary to ensure their 
appearance in court.8 The act also provided several factors for a judge to consider with respect to 
conditions provided for a defendant’s release, including the accused’s family, community ties, 
employment history, and past record of court appearances.9 The Act also required the release of 
 




5 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 33 (1789). 
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
7 Timbs v. Indiana , 139 S. Ct. 682, 689-690 (2019).  





non-capital defendants unless the judge had specific reasons to believe they would not appear for 
trial.10 Several states soon adopted their own, similar statutes.11 Notably, none of this legislation 
accounted for socio-economic concerns regarding the bail system. 
Rising fears of crime nationwide led to Congress passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984.12 
The Act allowed federal courts to detain arrestees pending trial where it is demonstrated by clear 
and convincing evidence that no release conditions could reasonably assure the safety of the 
community, rather than merely a showing that the defendant was a flight risk.13 This law was 
challenged in U.S. v. Salerno, where two men, including Salerno, had been charged under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).14 The government sought to detain 
Salerno pre-trial, alleging that as the head of a powerful crime family, Salerno posed a threat to 
community safety.15 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of detaining a defendant, 
holding that there was no Eighth Amendment bar to the government “pursuing compelling 
interests” such as public safety “through regulation of pre-trial release.”16 The Court also noted 
that “Congress did not formulate the pre-trial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous 
individuals”, and thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.17  
Today, commercial bail has grown into a $2 billion industry as bond agents charge 
exorbitant fees for helping keep defendants out of jail, with threats of being sent behind bars if 
 
10 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)-(g). 
11 Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained , VOX 
(Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-
inequality. 
12 Id. 
13 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
14 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 753. 




payments are missed—further exacerbating the disparate impact this system has on those with a 
lower socio-economic status.18 A system designed to provide financial incentives for the accused 
to attend later court hearings has resulted in nearly half a million unconvicted people— 
disproportionately poor people of color—sitting in jails simply awaiting trials.19 
B. Rationales for New Bail Reform 
 
The monetary bail system, in its current form, provides defendants claiming innocence only 
two choices with respect to ensuring their pre-trial discharge: post the designated bail amount, or 
arrange for a bond to secure their release from jail. Regardless of the crime committed or the 
potential danger to the public, if a defendant can afford to post bail the defendant will be released 
while awaiting trial. This methodology of release based on one’s ability to pay is an arbitrary and 
unfair approach to pre-trial release that does little to incentivize defendants to appear in court, and 
instead serves to “criminalize poverty”.20 Such a system would permit a wealthy person with 
resources that could render them a flight-risk to be released after committing a serious crime while 
a poor person sits in jail for a lesser offense, strictly based on the ability to post bail. This fact 
reinforces the concept that cash bail judgments are not being informed by proper considerations.  
Further, aside from the arbitrariness of using a defendant’s financial means to determine 
their pre-trial release, studies have demonstrated that the likelihood of being assigned cash bail in 
an initial arraignment can vary wildly from day-to-day and judge-to-judge.21 The decisions of 
 
18 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Shalia Dewan, When Bail Feels Less Like Freedom, More Like Extortion , N.Y. 
Times, (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/bail-bonds-extortion.html.  
19 Wykstra, supra note 11. 
20 Mark. F. Bernstein, How New Jersey Made a Bail Breakthrough , Princeton Alumni Wkly. (Nov. 2020), 
https://paw.princeton.edu/article/how-new-jersey-made-bail-breakthrough. 
21 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’ve Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay It? It May All Depend On Your 
Judge., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jun. 19, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-get-
bail-can-you-pay-it-it-may-all-depend-on-your-judge/. (A New York City study by the Legal Aid Society found that 
defendants charged with a misdemeanor in 2017 had between a 2 and 26% chance of the judge setting cash bail for 
release, depending on which judge was randomly assigned to the court on a given day. For felonies, the chances of 




judges with respect to cash bail determinations have far reaching, downstream consequences for 
defendants. Even a few days in jail can cost a person their job, their housing, or custody of 
children.22 Defendants who are detained pre-trial and unable to post bail are more likely to be 
convicted, either by trial or by plea deal—often times in effort to avoid further jailtime23—and 
have a lower chance of being sentenced to probation rather than jail than those who are released.24 
Notably, a Texas study found that “those who come from poorer zip codes were substantially more 
likely to be detained than those from wealthier zip codes” at a rate of more than 2-to-1.25 
Given the strain that a prolonged absence can have, financially and emotionally, on their 
families, many poor defendants choose to plead guilty to the pending charges even if they are 
innocent in order to secure release.26 While pleading provides temporary relief, the criminal record 
that often results can subsequently negatively impact an individual’s future housing, employment, 
and education prospects.27 As a result of these findings, critics have raised constitutional due 
process and equal protection concerns with “a money bail system that selectively detains the 
poor.”28  
These socio-economic considerations also tie closely to racial disparities in the justice 
system. A 2018 New Jersey study found that 42.8% of all high-poverty neighborhoods in the state 
were majority-Black, and 35.9% were majority-Hispanic.29 New Jersey’s state population is only 
 
22 Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial 
Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev., 711, 713, (2017).  
23 Id. at 714. 
24 Id. at 750. 
25 Id. at 737. (The authors note that is possible that the data reflects “differential offending by defendants from 
lower-income zip codes”, including, potentially, more serious offenses that would lead to hire expectant bail 
amounts).  
26 Bernstein, supra note 20. 
27 Pretrial Justice Reform, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION N.J., 
https://www.aclunj.org/theissues/criminaljustice/pretrial-justice-reform (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).  
28 Heaton, supra note 22, at 714. 






12.7% Black and 19.9% Hispanic.30 Notably, Black men compose 54% of those incarcerated in 
New Jersey31, and they are imprisoned at a rate more than 12 times that of white individuals in the 
state.32 Another study found that neighborhoods with the highest incarceration rates were 
predominantly Black and had high child poverty and male unemployment rates.33 Laws targeting 
lower income individuals—including cash bail systems—have downstream effects that 
disproportionately harm some racial groups more than others. 
Conversely, proponents of the monetary cash system—namely the $2 billion cash bail 
industry, some prosecutors, and some law enforcement officials—stress that the posting of bail 
provides a “financial incentive to make sure the person show[s] up for court” and claim that 
criminals are no longer afraid to commit crimes “because they know at the end of the day, they’re 
going to be released.”34 Others worry that the elimination of cash bail would lead to “dangerous 
and violent offenders [being] cut loose from jails and shoved into communities where innocent 









30 Stocovaz, supra note 29. 
31 Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s Working , 
WHYY.ORG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-officials-have-finally-released-data-on-bail-reform-their-
conclusion-its-working/. 
32 Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, New Jersey Has the Highest Black/white Youth Commitment/Detention Disparity Rate 
in the Country, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST. (Sept. 15, 2017),  https://www.njisj.org/institute. 
33 Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Work and Opportunity Before and After Incarceration , THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf . 
34 Sarah Wallace, ‘Nobody’s Afraid to Commit Crimes’: Cops, Victims Blast Overhaul of NJ Bail System, 
NBCNEWYORK.COM (May 18, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/bail-reform-new-
jersey-criminals-streets-law-jail-investigation/141250/. 





III. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTES BAIL REFORM 
A. The Joint Committee on Criminal Justice 
In 2013, the New Jersey Drug Policy Alliance conducted a study of the state’s jail 
population.36 The study observed that on a given day, more than 1,500 people—12 percent of the 
state’s total incarcerated population—were being detailed because they were unable to post bail of 
$2,500 or less.37 More than half of that group was being held on an unpaid bail of less than $500.38 
None of that group had yet been convicted of a crime.39 Overall, nearly 75 percent of New Jersey’s 
15,000 inmates were simply awaiting trial or sentencing.40 Moreover, nearly 40 percent of the 
state’s total prison population had the option to post bail but were financially unable to do so,41 
and defendants were found to have been detained for an average of 314 days as they awaited trial.42 
Additionally, the study also observed that 71 percent of the prison population was either Black or 
Hispanic.43 
Upon receipt of this report, New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Stuart Rabner 
assembled the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (“The Committee”) to consider reforms for 
the state’s pre-trial justice system, including the monetary bail system.44 The Committee included 
“representatives from the judiciary, the governor’s office, the attorney general’s office, the public 
defender’s office, both houses of legislature, and nongovernmental officials such as private 
 




40 Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In., ARNOLD 
VENTURES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-reform-its-cash-bail-
system-now-the-results-are-in/. 
41 Id. 
42 Maddie Hanna, N.J. Rethinks Bail- Who Gets Out, Who Stays Jailed, Phila. Inquirer (Jan 1, 2017), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/local/20170101_N_J__rethinks_bail_ -
_who_gets_out__who_stays_jailed.html. 
43 Admin. Office of the Cts., Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice  (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/finalreport3202014.pdf . 




criminal-defense attorneys and The American Civil Liberties Union.”45 In 2014, the Committee, 
with no dissenters, recommended comprehensive bail reform in New Jersey, which resulted in The  
Criminal Justice Reform Act (“The Act”).46  
B. The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) 
The Criminal Justice Reform Act passed in November 2014 and went into effect on January 
1, 2017.47 The Act replaced New Jersey’s reliance on monetary bail, and instead allowed for 
pretrial detention of defendants who present such a serious risk of danger, flight, or obstruction 
that no combination of monetary bail or release conditions would be adequate to guarantee their 
appearance in court.48  The Act promotes an “objective evaluation of each defendant’s risk level 
and consideration of conditions of release that pretrial services officers will monitor.”49  
Particularly, The Act sought to “rely primarily on ‘pretrial release by non-monetary means 
to reasonably assure’ that a defendant will ‘appear in court when required,’ will not endanger ‘the 
safety of any other person or the community,’ and ‘will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the 
criminal justice process.’”50 Only with a finding of  clear and convincing evidence that “no 
condition or combination of condition” would achieve those goals may a court order a defendant 
be held pending trial.51 Additionally, the legislation included a speedy trial provision, which stated 
that, excluding time for reasonable delays, “defendants cannot remain in jail for more than 90 days 
before the return of an indictment, or more than 180 days after indictment and before the start of 
 
45 Bernstein, supra note 20. 
46 Id. 
47 Pretrial Justice Reform, supra note 27. 
48 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1). 
49 State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 54 (2017) (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17).  





trial.”52 The Act also has a stated “fundamental mission . . . to ensure that all defendants are treated 
equally under the criminal justice system, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender.”53   
Furthermore, The Committee anticipated that the proposed changes would reduce the 
number of people detained pre-trial—an average of 9,000 a day—at least in half.54 The resulting 
reduction in state costs—each pre-trial detainee is estimated to cost approximately $100 a day— 
could also prove significant.55 
C. The First 48 Hours 
Under the Act, where a complaint-warrant is issued charging a person with an indictable 
offense, the defendant “‘shall be temporarily detained to allow the Pretrial Services Program to 
prepare a risk assessment and recommend conditions of release.”56 Prosecutors then present the 
findings of the Pretrial Services Program’s risk assessment to the court.57  Following this 
assessment and presentation of findings the court must make a pretrial release decision for the 
defendant within 48 hours after the eligible defendant’s commitment to jail.58 Defendants will 
either be: (a) released on their own recognizance or on execution of an unsecured appearance bond; 
(b) released on the least restrictive non-monetary condition or conditions to reasonably assure the 
defendant’s appearance in court, the safety of any person or the community, and that the defendant 
will not obstruct the criminal justice process; (c) released on monetary bail other than an unsecured 
 
52 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 56 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(a)(1)(a), (a)(2)). 
53 Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Report to the Governor and the Legislature, N.J. JUDICIARY (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=sT7. 
54 Kate Zernike, Panel Proposes Changes to New Jersey Bail System, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/nyregion/panel-recommends-significant-changes-to-new-jersey-bail-
system.html. 
55 Id.  
56 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 55 ((citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a)). 
57 Id. 




appearance bond; or (d) detained in jail, upon motion of the prosecutor, pending a pretrial detention 
hearing.59 
Notably, prosecutors are only able to seek detention of defendants under limited 
circumstances. Prosecutors may only seek detention: 
[W]hen an eligible defendant is charged with:  
(1) any crime of the first or second degree enumerated under [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.2(d)];  
(2) any crime for which the eligible defendant would be subject to an ordinary or 
extended term of life imprisonment;  
(3) any crime if the eligible defendant has been convicted of two or more offenses 
under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection;  
(4) any crime enumerated under [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2)] or crime involving human 
trafficking pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8] or [N.J.S.A. 52:17B-237 et al.] when the 
victim is a minor, or the crime of endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. 
2C:24-4;  
(5) any crime enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c);  
(6) any crime or offense involving domestic violence as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
19(a)]; or  
(7) any other crime for which the prosecutor believes there is a serious risk that:  
(a) the eligible defendant will not appear in court as required;  
(b) the eligible defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community; 
or  
(c) the eligible defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, 
injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a prospective 
witness or juror.60 
 
D. The Pretrial Detention Hearing 
When a prosecutor applies to the court for pretrial detention for a defendant, that defendant 
is held pending a hearing.61 At the hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel, to testify, to call 
and cross examine witnesses who appear, and to present information by proffer or otherwise.62 
Where there is no indictment, a prosecutor “shall establish probable cause that the eligible 
 
59 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 55-56 (citing to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(a-d)). 
60 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)). 
61 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 57. 




defendant committed the predicate offense.”63 At the hearing, the court is permitted to take into 
account: 
a. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;  
b. The weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant, except that the court 
may consider the admissibility of any evidence sought to be excluded;  
c. The history and characteristics of the eligible defendant, including: (1) the 
eligible defendant's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, 
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community 
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and 
record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (2) whether, at the time of 
the current offense or arrest, the eligible defendant was on probation, parole, or on 
other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an 
offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state;  
d. The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or the community 
that would be posed by the eligible defendant's release, if applicable;  
e. The nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the 
criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible defendant's release, if 
applicable; and  
f. The release recommendation of the pretrial services program obtained using a 
risk assessment instrument under [N.J.S.A. 2A:162- 25].64 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, any order of detention by the court must be supported by 
“clear and convincing evidence.”65 A judge’s order for a defendant to be detained pretrial must 
also “include written findings of fact.”66 Conversely, if a judge orders a defendant to be released 
contrary to the recommendation made in the pretrial risk assessment, the judge must explain their 
reasoning in the order.67  
E. Amendments to the Act- Broad Discovery in Pretrial Hearings 
After the New Jersey Legislature instituted the Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court asked 
the Committee to propose amendments to the court rules implementing the new law.68 Among its 
 
63 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e).  
64 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. 
65 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e). 
66 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a). 
67 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2).  




proposed amendments, the Committee recommended a broad discovery rule whereby a prosecutor 
seeking pretrial detention “shall provide all relevant material in its possession” to the defendant.69 
Dissenters within the Committee noted that a “complete discovery” requirement would be overly 
burdensome for prosecutors, and proposed that prosecutors seeking detention should be required 
to disclose “all statements or reports . . . that relate to the facts upon which the prosecutor relies in 
these motions.”70 The Court eventually adopted a rule closer to the dissenter’s proposal, requiring 
prosecutors seeking pretrial detention to “provide defendant with all statements or reports in its 
possession relating to the pretrial detention application”, including the disclosure of all exculpatory 
evidence, no later than 24 hours prior to the hearing.71 
This rule is more favorable to defendants than federal law, as it provides defendants broader 
discovery rights than does the federal system.72 In State v. Robinson, Chief Justice Rabner stated 
that rule 3:4-2(c) requiring “broad discovery” where a prosecutor seeks pretrial detention is 
justified because it sees that a defendant “accused of a crime and subject to possible detention is 
better able to challenge the State’s application and presentation.”73  
F. New Jersey’s Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool (The Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”)) 
To assist prosecutors and judges in determining whether to seek to detain or release a 
defendant pretrial, the Act permits the use of a risk-assessment tool.74 The New Jersey Judiciary 
adopted the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”) as its objective risk-assessment tool.75 Designed 
and developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation in 2013, the PSA uses a database of over 
1.5 million cases from more than 300 jurisdictions in attempt objectively identify factors that that 
 
69 Robinson, 229 N.J. at 60. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 60-61 (citing to N.J. Court Rules, R. 3:4-2(c)(1)(B)). 
72 Id. at 61. 
73 Id. at 68. 
74 Dabruzzo, supra note 40. 




“best predict whether a defendant will be arrested for a new crime, be arrested for a new violent 
crime, or fail to return to court” on their assigned date.76 As an “objective” tool, the PSA “gives 
no consideration to race, gender, education, socioeconomic status, or neighborhood.”77 
Specifically, the objective risk-assessment tool considers nine factors to assess the likelihood of 
pretrial success:  
(1) The defendant’s age at current arrest; 
(2) Whether the alleged crime is a violent offense, and if so, whether the defendant 
is age 20 or older; 
(3) Any additional pending charge(s) against the defendant at the time of the 
current arrest; 
(4) Any prior misdemeanor convictions on the defendant’s record ; 
(5) Any prior felony convictions on the defendant’s record; 
(6) Any prior violent convictions on the defendant’s record ; 
(7) Failures to appear in court in the past two years; 
(8) Failure to appear in court two or more years ago; or 
(9) Prior sentences to incarceration78 
At the conclusion of this automated pretrial process, the PSA provides predictions for three 
pretrial outcomes relating to a defendant’s (1) risk of failure to appear (FTA), (2) risk for new 
criminal activity (NCA), and (3) the risk for new violent criminal activity (NVCA).79 The FTA 
and NCA risks are provided on a scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest.80 The NVCA risk is 
determined by the presence or absence of a “violence flag”.81  In addition to providing risk scores, 
the PSA “recommends whether to release a defendant and what, if any, conditions of release to 
impose.”82 Notably, the PSA’s assessment is not dispositive of a defendant’s pretrial fate because, 
ultimately, it is the trial judge’s decision whether to release the defendant after considering the 
 
76 Pretrial Justice Reform, supra note 27. 
77 Id.  
78 About the Public Safety Assessment, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RES. (last visited Apr. 7, 2021), 
https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/factors/. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Id.  




PSA in conjunction with other relevant information.83 Where a determination is made to release a 
defendant, the pre-trial services division oversees the conditions of release which “can range from 
wearing an electric monitor to periodic check-ins with court staff, either in person or remotely.84  
G. Impact of New Jersey’s Bail Reform 
In April 2019, New Jersey’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) released the 
Report to the Governor and the Legislature regarding the early returns of the CJRA since its 
implementation.85 The report found that the state’s pretrial population declined by 44% from the 
end of 2015 to the end of 2018.86 An analysis of the jail population on October 3, 2018 revealed 
that there were 6,000 fewer detainees than on the same date in 2012.87 Of those detained pretrial 
on October 3, 2018, only 4.6% were being held on bail of $2,500 or less, down from 12% six years 
prior.88 Meanwhile, defendants charged with or sentenced for at least one violent offense made up 
47% of the detained population in 2018 compared to 35% on the same date in 2012, indicating that 
fewer violent offenders were able to secure their release simply because they were able to afford 
to post their bail, however expensive it may have been.89 Further, while the average defendant 
spent 62.4 days in jail pretrial in 2014, that time had decreased 40% to 37.2 days in 2017.90  
The study also found that rates of recidivism and failure to appear for court increased very 
slightly among defendants released pretrial.91 In 2017, 26.9% of defendants released from jail 
before their trials were charged with another new indictable offense, up from 24.2% in 2014.92  
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Court appearance rates among the released defendants remained high but decreased slightly from 
92.7% to 89.4% over the same period.93 Notably, state court officials stated that these increases of 
2.7% and 3.3%, respectively, were “statistically insignificant” and that “small changes in outcome 
measures should be interpreted with caution and likely do not represent meaningful differences.”94 
Still, while the jail’s overall population has decreased, the report revealed that disparities 
in the racial and ethnic makeup of the state’s jails remained the same.95 While 3,000 fewer Black, 
1,500 fewer White, and 1,300 fewer Hispanic defendants were detained pretrial in 2018 than on 
the same date in 2012, Black men accounted for 54% of the state’s jail population at each juncture, 
including after the bail reforms were instituted.96 Markedly, the percentage of Black women 
detained pretrial dropped from 44% to 34% over that time.97 In the study, the AOC acknowledged 
that “the overrepresentation of black males in the pretrial jail populations remains an area in need 
of further examination by New Jersey’s criminal justice system as a whole.”98  
IV. NEW JERSEY’S BAIL REFORMS UNDER A MICROSCOPE 
A. Assessing the Early Returns of NJ’s Reforms Against the Original Rationales  
 
The degree to which one finds New Jersey’s bail reforms successful will hinge upon what 
that person’s rationales and goals for the reforms were in the first place. A person interpreting 
these early returns must be honest about what bail reform can realistically achieve to provide fair 
and balanced analysis of the data. 
Firstly, an individual seeking to prioritize the elimination of socioeconomic disparities with 
respect to pretrial release determinations is likely very satisfied with the reform’s early returns. 
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The statistics provided in the AOC report appear to demonstrate that the CJRA is effective in 
addressing arbitrary distinctions in the system based on wealth. As such, “thousands of defendants 
who have not been convicted of a crime and are presumed innocent under the law will be free to 
remain with their families and their communities while they await their day in court.”99 This not 
only helps lower-income individuals continue to maintain their jobs, schooling, pay their rent, and 
care for loved ones, but also exposes fewer people to the negative effects of serving time behind 
bars strictly because they could not afford to pay the court. Fewer individuals being held pretrial 
also means fewer instances of detained defendants facing unfair disadvantages in the system, 
including higher rates of pleading guilty, being convicted, and receiving more prison sentences for 
longer periods of time at trial.    
Conversely, violent or higher-risk defendants who pose a threat to the community or 
present a substantial flight risk may no longer be granted release simply because they could afford 
to post their bail, however expensive it may be. That only 4.6% of pretrial detainees were being 
held on bail of less than $2,500 in 2018, down from 12% from six years prior, is evidence of a 
pretrial playing field that is leveling out.  
Meanwhile, a person primarily concerned with reducing the overall pretrial jail population 
in New Jersey would also find the AOC report encouraging. A 44% reduction in the overall pretrial 
jail population within three years is an impressive accomplishment. The greater-than-25-day 
reduction of the average amount of time defendants spent in jail pretrial from 2014 to 2018 was 
also a triumph for the CJRA, indicating greater efficiency in the system.  Moreover, the 
“statistically insignificant” increases in recidivism and missed court appearances among released 
defendants appear to suggest that concerns of critics regarding the release of accused individuals 
 




were unfounded.100 Given these statistics, the study concluded that the PSA had been “remarkably 
accurate” in assessing the risk to the community and of non-appearance posed by defendants.101 
Not to be ignored, these illuminating findings also raise questions and concerns with respect to 
past injustices that can no longer be corrected, why the previous system remained in place so long, 
and why it is still used in the majority of jurisdictions around the country.  
On the other hand, individuals, organizations, and legislatures primarily concerned with 
addressing racial disparities in the makeup of New Jersey’s prison population would likely find 
that the instituted reforms fell short of their goals. Despite the CJRA’s stated “fundamental mission 
. . . to ensure all defendants are treated equally under the criminal justice system, regardless of 
race, ethnicity, or gender”, the report found that Black men made up 54% of individuals detained 
pretrial in 2017—a figure identical to the pre-CRJA numbers in 2012—despite making up only 
15% of New Jersey’s population.102 In response to these findings, the ACLU acknowledged the 
AOC’s “commitment to continue addressing racial disparities,” but affirmed that “[a] system that 
reduces the number of incarcerated people but does not improve racial disparities is simply not 
good enough.”103 The AOC conceded in the report that “the overrepresentation of black males in 
the pretrial jail population remains an area in need of further examination by New Jersey’s criminal 
justice system as a whole.”104  
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Notably, the statistics regarding race reveal that there are issues within the justice system 
that are seemingly beyond the purview of bail reform. That the disproportionate number of Black 
men detained pretrial remained flat despite the reform’s successful reduction of the prison 
population suggests that race-related inequalities in the system may be connected to already 
existing racial disparities earlier in the criminal justice process. This theory invites a closer critique 
of procedures that may have inconsistent race applications and implications during defendants’ 
initial interactions with police, at the booking stage, and at the charging stage. Specifically, there 
is data to suggest that policing procedures such as stop-and-frisk disproportionately target Black 
and Hispanic citizens.105 Further studies have shown that “Black defendants face significantly 
more severe charges than whites, even after controlling for characteristics of the offense, criminal 
history, defense counsel type, age and education of the offender, and crime rates and economic 
characteristics of the jurisdiction.”106 The full causative nature of these areas requires further study 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
It is also important to recognize that the AOC, a division of the New Jersey Judiciary, 
conducting a study of its own implementations of these reforms could leave room for bias, intended 
or unintended, in the methodology of the study that could lead to skewed results and analysis. For 
example, after Cook County, Illinois adopted new bail reform measures in 2017, the Office of the 
Chief Judge of the Cook County Courts reviewed and reported on the effects of the measures two 
years later.107 This study concluded that the release of thousands of defendants pretrial did not 
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result in any increase in crime.108 However, a 2020 independent study of the Cook County reforms 
conducted by two professors at the University of Utah College of Law (UUCL) refuted those 
findings and reported a substantial increase in crime by pretrial releasees.109 The study found that 
new, violent crimes committed by releasees were largely undercounted, and raised questions as to 
whether the bail reform measures conflicted with public safety priorities.110 While the authors were 
not studying or interpreting New Jersey’s data, they dove deeply into the Cook County data to 
discover and express concerns.  
Similarly, some critics of the CJRA in New Jersey were quick to emphasize the increases 
in the percentage of defendant releasees who were charged with new offenses while awaiting trial 
(2.7% increase) and those who did not appear in court (3.3% increase), labeling the figures “non-
insignificant” in direct contrast to the AOC’s interpretations.111 Further research, similar to the 
UUCL study, critiquing the AOC’s methods and data analysis would go a long way to confirming 
or disputing the AOC’s findings on New Jersey’s bail reforms.  
B. Concerns with the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) 
Regarding the CJRA’s ineffectiveness in addressing the disproportionate racial makeup of 
New Jersey’s pretrial prison population, many criminal justice activists and organizations point to 
the CRJA’s use of the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) as a reason for the perpetual disparities. 
Critics of such algorithmic risk assessments include University of Georgia Law professor Sandra 
Mayson, who notes that “[a]lgorithmic assessment carries a scientific aura, which can produce 
unwarranted deference or a mistaken impression of objectivity.”112 Mayson challenges the 
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objectivity of these practices, observing that “in a racially stratified world, any method of 
prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the future.”113 Consequently, using past data 
on arrest that disproportionately impacts Black individuals over White ones will result in 
“predictive analysis [that] will project it to happen more frequently to Black people than to white 
people in the future.”114 Notably, arrest rates in most places for nearly all crimes have shown racial 
disparities for decades.115 As such, criminal history data is bound to be distorted and inherently 
biased, which, in turn, will distort the findings and results of pretrial risk assessments.  
 These concerns about potential bias in the PSA led one prominent pretrial reform group to 
rescind its support for New Jerseys bail reform. The Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) was instrumental 
in New Jersey’s adoption of the PSA in 2014 and heavily advocated for its use across the nation 
to reduce the ballooning prison population.116 In 2017 the PJI gave New Jersey’s bail system the 
only “A” rating in the country.117 However, they revoked that grade in early 2020, finding that 
such pretrial assessment tools are “derived from data reflecting structural racism and inequality 
that impact our court and law enforcement policies and practices,” and that use of the data 
perpetuates those racial inequalities.118 The PJI pointed specifically to the flat demographics of 
New Jersey’s prison population despite the near elimination of cash bail in modifying their 
evaluation of the state’s bail system.119 
 In addition to the PJI, more than 100 civil rights, digital justice, and community-based 
organizations, including the ACLU and NAACP, signed a joint statement condemning the use of 
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predictive pretrial risk assessment tools.120 The statement laid out civil rights concerns regarding 
the data that is inputted into the system and gave recommendations for modifying the tools in 
jurisdictions that already have them in place.121 These suggestions included community 
involvement in the design of the algorithms, as well as independent auditing of the tools to ensure 
that the measures result in reducing jail populations and effectively address racial disparities.122  
 Lastly, there is little research to confirm exactly how the results and recommendations of 
the PSA are used by judges.123 While PSA predictions are intended to “inform pretrial release 
conditions” rather than be dispositive their own124, whether judges rely on them entirely or ignore 
them completely in making pretrial release decisions likely varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
and judge to judge.125 This makes collecting data on the use of the tools in courtrooms more 
difficult to collect and analyze.126 
 On the other hand, in her paper, Mayson suggests that “the default alternative--subjective 
risk assessment--is very likely to be worse.”127 Mayson points to recent studies that confirm that 
“risk assessments completed using structured approaches produce estimates that are more reliable 
and more accurate than unstructured risk assessments.”128 While algorithms can be examined and 
analyzed, subjective assessments are less accountable and transparent and often contain their own 
implicit or unconscious biases.129 
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C. Other States’ Attempts at Bail Reform 
New Jersey is not the only state that sought to implement reforms of their cash-bail system 
in effort to reduce the prison population and alleviate racial and socio-economic disparities in the 
penal system. Other states have made efforts to reduce or eliminate the use of cash bail with 
differing legislation and varying results of success.  
In New York, mandatory cash bail evaluations were eliminated for most misdemeanor and 
non-violent felony charges as of the start of 2020.130 However, unlike New Jersey, New York 
initially chose not to provide judges with ultimate discretion regarding whether a defendant poses 
a threat to the public safety and should be detained pretrial.131 While judges in the state were only 
previously permitted to consider a defendant’s flight risk in setting their bail, many judges 
previously still had discretion to set higher bail amounts for repeat offenders or individuals deemed 
likely to commit another crime.132 New Jersey, on the other hand, requires that risk of flight and 
potential danger to the community be considered in by judges in making pretrial release 
determinations.133 Following heavy backlash prior to and just after the law took effect, after only 
three months New York’s bail reform bill was amended to expand the number and types of crimes 
for which judges could impose cash bail.134 The revised list included almost all violent felonies, 
second degree burglary, sex offenses, and all charges alleged to have caused a person’s death.135   
The amendments also expanded judges’ discretion, permitting them to consider a 
defendant’s criminal history and status in setting cash bail and providing a wider selection of 
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conditions—from travel restrictions to counseling—to be imposed on releasees.136  Further, despite 
the expansion of bail-eligible offenses, a judge is not required to impose bail and may instead 
choose to release defendants under one or more conditions.137  
Markedly, New York’s bail reform legislation did not adopt a risk-assessment tool.138 
While the law does not prohibit or require the use of such methods, assessment used must be 
“empirically validated and free from discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, or 
any other protected class.”139 The lack of an adopted risk assessment tool was not an oversight, as 
several organizations, including Citizen Action New York, actively advocated for their omission 
in the reforms over concerns of inherent discrimination based on race and socioeconomic status.140 
The balance between leveling an unfair bail system and ensuring public safety continues to be a 
divisive political issue within the state.141  
Meanwhile, in February 2021, Illinois became the first state to completely abolish the use 
of cash bail to secure defendants’ release from jail pretrial.142 The Illinois Pre-Trial Fairness Act 
(725 ILCS 185) will take effect on July 1, 2021, but the elimination of cash bail will begin in 
January 2023.143 Instead of cash bail, judges may detain a defendant where they “might willfully 
flee from prosecution or if they are ‘a real and present threat to the safety of a specific, identifiable 
person.’”144 As in New Jersey, judges will have final discretion to decide whether those conditions 
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apply and a defendant should be held, though all pretrial hearings will begin with the assumption 
that the defendant should be released.145 
Still, despite efforts of some groups to ban the use of pretrial risk assessments, the tools 
will be available to provide recommendations for Illinois judges in their pretrial detainment 
deliberations, though their use is not mandated.146 The algorithm’s recommendations are to be 
used as suggestion only, and data about the algorithms will be published regularly.147 The bill also 
mandates that all results of any risk assessment must be forwarded to defense lawyers who may 
rebut and challenge the findings.148 Moreover, skeptics of risk assessment tools are viewing the 
bill with cautious optimism, as the legislation also includes prison reform, new guidelines for 
training police, addressing the use of force, and a process for decertifying police officers who 
commit misconduct.149 Ideally, these additional reforms will help alleviate causes of racial 
disparity earlier in the criminal justice process.   
 Additionally, the Illinois reforms also regulate the use of electronic monitoring as a means 
of surveillance, which advocates say is an “alternative form of incarceration” that can be just as 
punitive, invasive, and restrictive as being put in jail.150 Prosecutors will bear the burden to prove 
that the court has reason to monitor the releasee.151 This proof must be offered prior to any 
surveillance, and, if sufficient, is to be revisited after 60 days.152 Further, in another legislative 
first, a defendant’s time with an electric monitor will be considered time “served” and is to be 
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subtracted from any court sentence.153 Overall, Illinois’ bail reform has “some of the strictest 
restrictions on who can be incarcerated pretrial.”154  
Conversely, though the California State Legislature approved a measure in 2018 that would 
have abolished cash bail in the state, that legislation, Proposition 25, was defeated by voters at the 
ballot box in the November 2020 election.155 The law would have required those charged with 
most misdemeanor offenses to be released from custody within 12 hours.156 Other defendants 
would have undergone risk assessments, with judges having final say over their release.157 The 
measure was heavily opposed by the bail industry, who spent more than $10 million on a campaign 
to defeat it.158 Also, some advocates of bail reform such as the Human Rights Watch, also opposed 
the bill, stating that it uses “racially biased risk assessment tools [and] gives judges nearly 
unlimited discretion to incarcerate.”159 
Undeterred, California lawmakers have continued to introduce bail reform bills aimed at 
eliminating unfair bail practices and racial and socioeconomic disparities.160 Two new bills would 
move to “set bail at $0 for misdemeanors and ‘low-level felonies’ and require money to be 
refunded if an arrestee makes all their court appearances, their charges are dropped, or their case 
is dismissed.”161 Opponents of cash bail intend to continue to fight for bail reform in California 
with “presumption of innocence as its guiding principle.”162 
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V. LOOKING AHEAD IN NEW JERSEY 
A. Finding the Balance Between Harms Averted and Harms Imposed While Accounting 
for Racial Disparities in the Justice System 
Properly assessing the strengths and weaknesses and successes and failures of New 
Jersey’s bail reform requires an honest assessment of the intended goals and realistic purview of 
the endeavor. That Black men are still disproportionately represented in New Jersey prisons after 
these reforms indicates that racial disparity in the justice system may be an issue outside the 
purview of bail reform. This realization is valuable in that more attention can be focused on other, 
earlier stages of criminal justice, including initial police interactions, the booking stage, and the 
charging stage. The reforms’ ineffectiveness in this area may be disappointing, but it does not 
mean that other goals were not achieved. 
The early returns of the CJRA indicate that limiting the use of cash bail pretrial is an 
effective means of reducing a ballooning prison population. It is also apparent that curbing the use 
of cash bail as the predominant means of securing a defendant’s pretrial release helps level the 
playing field for the less-wealthy and abates the use of wealth as an arbitrary and unfair determiner 
of who may or may not go home to their families, communities, and jobs. The statistics show that 
thousands of detainees could be released from prison while awaiting trial with “statistically 
insignificant” increases in new crimes committed by releasees or failures to appear in court.  
This balance of preventing future harms to society and imposing harms on defendants was 
closely examined by University of Georgia School of Law professor Sandra Mayson and 
University of Virginia School of Law professor Megan Stevenson.163 Their research indicated two 
general principles regarding pretrial detention: “(1) detention must avert greater harm (by 
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preventing crime) than it inflicts (by depriving a person of liberty), and (2) prohibitions against 
pretrial punishment mean that the harm experienced by the detainee cannot be discounted in the 
cost-benefit analysis.”164 In their research, the professors asked respondents to “choose between 
being the victim of certain crimes or being jailed for varying time periods.”165 The results indicated 
that “even short periods of incarceration impose grave harms, such that a person must pose an 
extremely high risk of serious crime in order for detention to be justified.”166  People who are 
detained risk losing their sources of income and, consequentially, their homes, cars, ability to care 
for love ones, and the stability of their families and communities. These consequences experienced 
by detainees and those connected to them are too impactful to ignore when weighing potential 
harms of detention or release.167 New Jersey’s bail reforms, which resulted in the release of 
thousands of defendants who may have otherwise been detained, is seemingly effective at 
alleviating some of these concerns.  
However, New Jersey’s regular practice of using of risk assessment tools- namely the 
Public Safety Assessment- risks allowing racial inequalities earlier in the criminal justice process 
to bleed into pretrial detention hearings and result in jailtime for additional defendants. The PSA’s 
use of data regarding the legal histories of minority defendants- who are more likely to have police 
interactions than their White counterparts- may be skewed due to preexisting injustices, which, in 
turn, skews the results and recommendations of the PSA algorithm. New Jersey legislatures would 
be wise to follow the lead of Illinois in taking steps to reform police training (including use of 
 
164 Stevenson, supra note 163 at 5. 
165 Id. at 6.  
166 Id. (This “contingent valuation” survey method does not account for variables regarding the specific nature of t he 
burglary hypothetically committed against the respondent, including, for example, whether the crime occurs at the 
victim’s home, what property was taken, or whether the assailant carried a weapon. The infinite number of variables 
in such a hypothetical scenario make a true balancing test between victimization and jailtime extremely difficult).  
167 While the impacts of detention on detainees must be considered in any balancing test, so too must the direct and 




force guidelines), as well as measures to hold offending officers responsible for misconduct. These 
actions could address some of the racial disparities that enter the system prior to the pretrial stage.  
B. Auditing, Reporting, and Evolving  
Further, New Jersey lawmakers should closely monitor the results of Illinois’ bail reforms 
once they take hold in 2023. Results from the complete elimination of cash bail could lead to an 
entirely new perspective on the lengths to which bail reform can safely go in limiting pretrial 
detention without significant consequences. Illinois’ regulation of and restrictions on electronic 
monitoring will also be worthy of close analysis, as the overuse of such conditions can prove just 
as punitive and invasive as incarceration in some cases, effectively replacing one form of 
surveillance with another. Illinois’ success in promoting liberty interests and saving money on 
electronic monitoring equipment, maintenance, and supervision could prove promising for New 
Jersey. 
Finally, New Jersey must be diligent in appointing outside analysts and auditors to 
consistently monitor and report on statistics coming from the New Jersey Judiciary.  Not only must 
there be fact-checks on the judiciary itself, but an outside perspective on the data coming from the 
state’s court system and prisons is essential to promoting honesty and fairness. To demonstrate 
full transparency and openness, and in the active pursuit of stated objectives, New Jersey would 
be wise to appoint a committee of scholars, analysts, and criminal justice experts from outside the 
state’s system to investigate and evaluate the bail and pre-trial detainment/release data provided 
by the state judiciary and other official sources. Such analysis can remove concerns regarding 
conflicts of interest in the release of state statistics while also providing valuable context for the 
records. Also, independent studies, such as the 2020 review of the Cook County Court’s report on 




subsequent legislation, but may have otherwise gone unrealized. Continuous reporting on the 
statistics will enable lawmakers to keep track of encouraging or disconcerting trends in detainment 
figures and consider and take courses of action to address and improve on the existing measures.  
The goal of New Jersey’s bail reform should not be to merely replace a bad system with a less-bad 
system, but to continuously improve and evolve into a more-perfect system that curbs unfairness 
and inequality and promotes liberty and justice for all. 
